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It’s a recession when your neighbor loses his job;
It’s a depression when you lose yours 1
This Article examines the policy of taxing long-term unemployment in
jurisdictions where unemployed individuals are entitled to unemployment
benefits. It claims that tax systems should not tax the unemployed regardless of
whether they reenter the labor market. In the U.S. and many other developed
countries, it is common to grant unemployment benefits and tax them. In those
jurisdictions, tax laws in general do not distinguish between short- and longterm unemployed taxpayers. Given that the future of the professional and
occupational security of the unemployed is uncertain mainly due to the twentyfirst century’s new challenges, taxation should take into consideration, ex post,
the future “dimension” of equity. Equity cannot be measured over a single year,
but over a longer period, during which we should examine whether the
unemployed population has become chronically unemployed—which would
include those who cannot find a job even after exhausting their rights to
unemployment insurance. Note that until now, tax laws have treated the
unemployed uniformly, without distinguishing between regular and chronic
unemployment.
Unemployment is a major global socioeconomic problem, and many
individuals are unemployed in developed countries as well. The fear of
expanding unemployment grows during recessions, when the chances of finding
Senior Lecturer, School of Law, Ono Academic College.
1. Oxford Reference, https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/97801918437
30.001.0001/q-oro-ed5-00011019 (last visited June 5, 2021).
+
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a job are lower; but it also results from technological progress. The twenty-first
century began just two decades ago, but has already seen multiple local and
global economic crises: the 2008 crisis, and, above all, the coronavirus
pandemic, which has been affecting employment worldwide. Economists
predict that the post-coronavirus unemployment crisis could continue for many
years 2 and compare it to the unemployment of the Great Recession. 3 However,
note that growing unemployment is also a byproduct of the digital economy,
which started before the pandemic. As early as the 1930s, John M. Keynes
expressed his fear of the economic challenges his grandchildren’s generation
would face, coining the term “technological unemployment.” 4 Several
contemporary economists substantiate this fear by showing that some
occupations and professions are bound to disappear. 5 Even in more optimistic
scenarios, where the digital economy would not just eliminate jobs but create
new types of jobs, individuals may still face unemployment in the transition
period—before they are able to acquire new skills. 6 Thus, due to the economic
crises and the digital economy, but mainly because of the latest coronavirus
pandemic, which forced millions of people around the globe to stay at home and
lose their jobs, unemployment is now more relevant than ever.
Unemployment is becoming chronic, with many remaining involuntarily
jobless for a long period, including those who are available for work and who
are “seeking work” 7 to the point of exhausting their unemployment insurance
rights. Economists usually treat a period of over six months as severe
unemployment, though the definition of chronic unemployment may vary across
2. See, e.g., Vince Golle & Sarina Yoo, The Post-Coronavirus Unemployment Crisis Could
Last for Years, Economists Say, TIME (Apr. 10, 2020), https://time.com/5819080/unemploymentcoronavirus/.
3. See, e.g., Simon Kennedy, Risk to Jobs Now “Unprecedented Since the Great
Depression,” BLOOMBERG (Apr. 4, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0403/jobs-destroyed-worldwide-as-coronavirus-sparks-recession.
4. John Maynard Keynes, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren, in ESSAYS IN
PERSUASION 364 (1933).
5. See Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How
Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation? 48 (Oxford Martin Programme on Tech. & Emp.,
Working Paper, 2013), https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/future-ofemployment.pdf (examining the influence of the technological development of U.S. labor market
and finding that 47% of U.S. workers are at risk and that “wages and educational attainment exhibit
a strong negative relationship with [an occupation’s] probability of computerization. . . .
[C]omputerisation being principally confined to low-skill and low-wage occupations”).
6. See Markus Lorenz et al., Man and Machine in Industry 4.0., THE BOS. CONSULTING
GRP.
8
(Sept.
2015),
http://englishbulletin.adapt.it/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/BCG_Man_and_Machine_in_Industry_4_0_Sep_2015_tcm80197250.pdf.
7. See Int’l Labour Org. [ILO], Resolution Concerning Statistics of the Economically Active
Population, Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment ¶ 10(1)(c) (Oct. 1982),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-dgreports/—
stat/documents/normativeinstrument/wcms_087481.pdf.
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countries. 8 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), data, for example, show that the number of those unemployed for over
twelve months is still significant. 9 In the United States, unemployment is
considered long-term when it continues for over twenty-seven weeks. 10
The reasons for being chronically unemployed vary. For example, the
professional skills of the unemployed may not be required by the market, and
employers may stigmatize them for having inferior skills. In addition, low-skill
workers face difficulties finding a job in the digital robot economy, keeping
them unemployed for a long period. This long period of unemployment weakens
the willingness of the unemployed to seriously look for a job. As does, naturally,
the global economic crisis due to COVID-19 that shut down large sectors of the
economy for a long period.
This Article does not claim that tax law is the best scheme to address
unemployment. Instead, it argues that given the significant power of tax law to
direct human behavior, countries that have adopted unemployment benefits
should address growing chronic unemployment needs from a tax perspective as
well. The Article supports general taxation of unemployment benefits, but
asserts that equity is compromised when tax law does not differentiate between
unemployment benefits received by regularly and chronically unemployed—
and, accordingly, does not promote social values.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly introduces
the social and individual problems of unemployment. Parts II and III,
respectively, comparatively review unemployment benefits and their taxation,
and discuss American law. The main part—Part IV—begins with the
mainstream arguments for and against taxing unemployment benefits. It then
analyzes the question of long-term unemployment through both the lifecycle
theory and the principle of reciprocity, and concludes by recommending that the
unemployment benefit tax be reimbursed in the case of the chronically
unemployed in order to achieve equity.
I. THE PROBLEM OF UNEMPLOYMENT
This Article proceeds on the following assumptions.
First, that
unemployment—regular or chronic—is undesirable for both the individual and
society as a whole; and second, that unemployment benefits are necessary to
preserve a just and well-ordered society (and the Article does not discuss the
8. See, e.g., Gary Burtless, Long-Term Unemployment: Anatomy of the Scourge,
BROOKINGS (July 27, 2012), www.brookings.edu/articles/long-term-unemployment-anatomy-ofthe-scourge/.
9. See OECD Employment Outlook 2016, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. 28–
29
(2016),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employment-outlook2016_empl_outlook-2016-en (stating that although long-term unemployment increased by 55%
between 2007 and 2015, it has recently been slightly declining).
10. Employment Situation Summary, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Oct. 5, 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t12.htm.
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social alternatives of unemployment benefits). 11 The negative implications of
unemployment for an individual and his family are obvious. It carries direct
economic implications, as well as less direct social and emotional effects, as
Truman’s opening quote illustrates.
Moreover, unemployment is not just an individual but also a national problem.
The OECD regularly publishes statistics on unemployment in member states,
including during the pandemic, and reports are also available from the
International Labor Organization (ILO). The data from both organizations are
cause for concern, especially with respect to recent publications on the sudden
rise of individuals unemployed due to the coronavirus pandemic. For example,
approximately twenty million people became jobless in the United States in just
four weeks due to the coronavirus restrictions, 12 and that number almost doubled
in a month. 13
Regardless of the COVID-19 pandemic, in 2000, about one-third of the
world’s population was unemployed or underemployed. 14 Following the global
economic crisis of 2008 and various technological developments that eliminated
jobs, the number of unemployed individuals increased significantly in OECD
member states. 15 The number of long-term unemployed individuals also grew,
and, as of 2016, “one in three unemployed persons” were long-term
unemployed. 16 In the last few years, there has been some improvement, 17
although the improvement among chronically unemployed was lower than

11. See Cheung Wai-lam, Unemployment-Related Benefits Systems in Singapore, RSCH. &
LIBR. SERVS. DIV. LEGIS. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT 4, 6, 8 (June 2000),
https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr99-00/english/sec/library/e17.pdf (discussing that most countries
adopt unemployment benefits, while other countries, such as Singapore, support a different
assistance program). In Singapore, the main program is to help the unemployed seek a new job,
but there is also some financial assistance for the short term. Id. at 8.
12. See Nelson D. Schwartz, “Nowhere to Hide” as Unemployment Permeates the Economy,
TIMES
(May
28,
2020),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/16/business/economy/unemployment-numberscoronavirus.html.
13. See Lauren Aratani, Jobless America: The Coronavirus Unemployment Crisis in Figures,
THE GUARDIAN (May 28, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/28/joblessamerica-unemployment-coronavirus-in-figures.
14. World Labour Report 2000: Income Security and Social Protection in a Changing World,
LAB.
OFF.
4
(Nov.
2000)
[hereinafter
ILO
Report],
INT’L
https://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb279/pdf/esp-7.pdf.
15. The increase in the unemployment rate among OECD state members can be observed in
the graph available at OECD, Unemployment Rate, https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemploymentrate.htm.
16. See OECD Employment Outlook 2017, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. 23
(2017) [hereinafter OECD 2017], https://data.oecd.org/unemp/unemployment-rate.htm (last visited
June 5, 2021).
17. See OECD Employment Outlook 2018, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. 22
(2018) [hereinafter OECD 2018], https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/employment/oecd-employmentoutlook-2018_empl_outlook-2018-en.

Summer 2021]

Taxation of Long-Term Unemployment

425

among “regularly” unemployed. 18 Nevertheless, this data was before the
outbreak of the pandemic and, as of today, the OECD identifies a sharp growth
of unemployment. 19 The OECD is not only concerned with the number of
unemployed, but also with the externalities of that phenomenon—primarily skill
depreciation. Unemployment may cause individuals to compromise, and force
them to take either part-time jobs or jobs for which they are overqualified. 20
As previously stated, this Article’s two premises are that unemployment is
undesirable and unemployment benefits are necessary. There may be various
mechanisms to address the long-term unemployment problem, but this Article
addresses it through the prism of taxation by showing that the current system
applied in many countries has an impaired tax rationale. Before discussing the
proper way to tax long-term unemployment in the twenty-first century, this
Article briefly presents the global social security law and its taxation aspects.
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND TAXATION
International law recognizes the social necessity of securing the unemployed,
with social security seen as a universal social right in the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 21 Article 23(1) of the Declaration states that
“[e]veryone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and
favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.” 22
Articles 19–24 of the 1952 Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention
oblige member states to secure the unemployed with employment benefits 23—a
duty reinforced by Article 9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 24
Despite the international treaties, most of the global population does not enjoy
any unemployment protection. 25 Nevertheless, in developed countries, there are
18. OECD 2017, supra note 16, at 23.
19. See Unemployment Rates, OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
https://www.oecd.org/sdd/labour-stats/unemployment-rates-oecd-update-may-2020.htm
(last
updated May 2020).
20. See, e.g., OECD 2018, supra note 17, at 12; OECD 2017, supra note 16, at 27.
21. G.A. Res. 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 22 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization,
through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality.”).
22. Id. art. 23(1).
23. See INT’L LAB. ORG. [ILO], Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, June 28,
1952,
No.
102,
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C102.
24. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, at 7 (Dec. 16, 1966), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c0.html (“The States Parties
to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, including social
insurance.”).
25. ILO Report, supra note 14, at 6.

426

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70:421

three main mechanisms to assist the unemployed: unemployment insurance (UI),
which is the focus of this Article, unemployment assistance (UA), and social
assistance (SA). 26 UI is part of social law, aimed at granting financial security
during unemployment by redistribution. In general, unemployment benefits are
payments given to unemployed individuals by authorized institutions. It is
compulsory insurance (also named unemployment insurance) that is financed by
taxes levied on employees’ salaries. Under certain conditions, the unemployed
are entitled to compensation. Unemployment benefits are a common social
mechanism, for example, in EU countries and in most OECD member states
(excluding, for example, Singapore, which has adopted a different form of social
assistance). 27 Unemployment benefits are usually derived from past salaries,
but their scope and range vary between states. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic,
many countries have adjusted the unemployment compensation terms either by
amount or duration; or, alternatively, by extending the recipient’s identity. For
example, in the United States, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic
Security (CARES) Act, signed on March 27, 2020, authorizes states to extend
unemployment compensation even to individuals who are usually not entitled to
unemployment compensation, such as independent contractors. 28
In addition, because unemployment compensation is derived from past
salaries, it is usually treated as ordinary income and taxed accordingly with
regard to income taxation. 29 In several countries, it is exempted from tax. 30 For
example, in Germany, unemployment benefits are not taxed; 31 rather, they are
added to other income for determining the tax rate, thus subjecting the other
income (if any) to a higher tax rate. 32
26. See Jackie WU, Unemployment-Related Benefits Systems in the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Countries, RSCH. & LIBR. SERVS. DIV. LEGIS.
COUNCIL SECRETARIAT 3–6, 9–10, 16 (June 2000), https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr9900/english/sec/library/e13.pdf (stating that in some countries, unemployment assistance and social
assistance are usually granted when the unemployed have exhausted their rights with respect to
unemployment benefits).
27. See id. at 6–8; Ingrid Esser et. al., Unemployment Benefits in EU Member States,
EUROPEAN COMM’N 5 (2013), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=10852&langId=en;
see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
28. CARES Act of 2020, Pub. L. No.116–136, 134 Stat. 281, § 1002(a)(1)(D)(ii) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
29. Id.
30. See WU, supra note 26, at 5 (excluding from Table 1, for example, Germany, Japan, and
South Korea).
31. See Sozialgesetzbuch III Drittes Buch [SGB] [Social Code Third Book—Employment
Promotion], § 434j, para. 5a, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/sgb_3/BJNR059500997.html
(Ger.); see also OECD Economic Surveys: Germany, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.
97
(2006),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-economic-surveys-germany2006_eco_surveys-deu-2006-en. For the tax exemption, see Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG]
[Income Tax Act], § 3, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/estg/ (Ger.) (stating tax exemption).
32. See EStG, § 32b(1)(a), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/estg/ (Ger.) (stating
progressive rate).
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III. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND TAXATION IN THE U.S.
In 1935, the United States adopted an unemployment benefits program. 33
This program is mainly executed through the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA), 34 but not solely. Unemployment benefits are administered in a
combined program, run by the federal and state governments, 35 and in ordinary
times (excluding the COVID-19 crisis) most employees—except self-employed
individuals—are entitled to unemployment benefits. 36 Each employee is taxed
on his income so long as he works, and this tax then finances unemployment
benefits for involuntary unemployment. 37
Unemployment benefits assist the unemployed in some but not all
unemployment circumstances. Those who become unemployed voluntarily
without good cause, or unemployed persons who have lost their jobs due to
misconduct, are disqualified, despite having financed the program while
employed. 38 The taxes levied by each state are deposited in the Unemployment
Trust Fund, but the conditions and tax rates vary across states. 39 Nevertheless,
there is one tendency shared by all states: since the 2008 financial crisis, most
states have decreased the maximum duration of entitled unemployment benefits
and their payment extent, 40 though this duration was partly released during the
COVID-19 economic crisis. 41 For example, in the U.S. the Families First
Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA) was enacted to alleviate the economic
effects of the pandemic. It aimed, inter alia, at easing the “eligibility
39F

40F

41F

33. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574, 585, 598 (1937) (holding that the
Social Security Act of 1935, which imposed a tax on employers to fund unemployment benefits,
was constitutional and within Congress’ power).
34. I.R.C. §§ 3301–3311.
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501–04, 1101–09, 1321–24; Jonathan Barry Forman, The Income Tax
Treatment of Social Welfare Benefits, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785, 792 (1993); Wayne Vorman
et al., A Comparative Analysis of Unemployment Insurance Financing Methods, URBAN INST. 1,
216 (Dec. 2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/OASP/legacy/files/A-ComparativeAnalysis-of-Unemployment-Insurance-Financing-Methods-Final-Report.pdf.
36. Edward W. Harris, Payroll Tax, Federal, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX
POLICY 293, 294 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005). But see supra note 28 (extending the
entitlement to unemployment compensation through COVID-19 crisis).
37. Id. at 294.
38. SAUL J. BLAUSTEIN ET AL., UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY 88 (1993).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
40. KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41859, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE:
CONSEQUENCES OF CHANGES IN STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION LAWS 7 (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41859.pdf.
41. See Unemployment Insurance Extended Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. (Nov. 1, 2019)
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/extenben.asp (explaining that unemployment insurance extends
benefits that are granted “during periods of high unemployment”); see also Unemployment Rates,
OECD—Updated: May 2020, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
https://www.oecd.org/sdd/labour-stats/unemployment-rates-oecd-update-may-2020.htm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
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requirements and access to unemployment compensation for claimants,
including waiving work search requirements and the waiting week”. 42 Today,
unemployment benefits are taxed in the United States as ordinary income,
similar to most OECD member states. 43 Nevertheless, until the 1980s,
unemployment benefits were not necessarily taxed. 44 In the next Part, I will
discuss the main rationales for and against taxing unemployment benefits.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Taxation of Unemployment Benefits—Pros and Cons
Before diving into our research question, I will briefly discuss the pros and
cons of taxing unemployment benefits. It seems that the main argument for
taxing unemployment benefits is to induce people to work. 45 Unemployment
benefits may deter the unemployed from looking for a job, because they are
compensated for their lost salary income. Some empirical studies support this
claim, showing that unemployment benefits prolong the unemployment
period. 46 This is a moral hazard problem, causing the unemployed to change
their behavior to avoid returning to the workforce because of the benefits. 47
This argument was officially raised in the U.S. when a proposal to reform tax
unemployment benefits was introduced. In 1977, the Blueprints for the Basic
Tax Reform stated that “by taxing earnings and unemployment benefits alike,
this treatment would reduce the disincentive to seek alternative or interim
employment during the period of eligibility for unemployment benefits.” 48
Therefore, taxing unemployment benefits similarly to salaries (especially when
unemployment benefits are usually lower 49) would induce the unemployed to
rejoin the workforce. Note that even if this argument is true, it is doubtful
42. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA), Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat.
193 (2020).
43. I.R.C. § 85. For the taxation of unemployment benefits in OECD state members, see, e.g.,
ROBERT J. FLANGAN, UNEMPLOYMENT AS A HIRING PROBLEM, 124, 127 (1989), available at
https://www.oecd.org/economy/growth/35260989.pdf.
44. See, e.g., David Weiner, Social Security Benefits, Federal Taxation of, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION & TAX POLICY 362, 362 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2005).
45. See Wai-lam, supra note 11, at 4 (stating that “the best way to assist individuals who are
retrenched or unemployed is to help them seek reemployment instead of handing out financial
support such as unemployment benefits” and, additionally, that this rationale also supports not
adopting an unemployment benefit program).
46. See Gary Solon, Work Incentive Effects of Taxing Unemployment Benefits, 53
ECONOMETRICA 295, 305 (1985) (examining the tax treatment of unemployment benefits on
taxpayers with high income); Martin Feldstein, Unemployment Compensation: Adverse Incentives
and Distributional Anomalies, 27 NAT’L TAX J. 231, 243 (1974).
47. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 56–57
(2d ed. 1989) (discussing the problem of moral hazard).
48. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS. 61 (Jan. 17, 1977),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Blueprints-1977.pdf.
49. See Isaacs, supra note 40, at 4, 7–12.
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whether reimbursing the tax payments, would induce the chronically
unemployed (as opposed to “regularly” unemployed) to stay jobless, given that
those payments are usually negligible since they derived from the former salary
and the tax is applied on a much lower amount.
The second argument in favor of taxing unemployment benefits, also raised
in the blueprint, relates to equity. Some argue that taxation “conforms with the
basic equity principle of subjecting all income to the same tax. Employed
individuals would not be subject to a differentially higher tax than those of equal
income who derive their income from unemployment benefits.” 50 If we tax an
employed person and do not tax an unemployed individual who receives
unemployment benefits, where both individuals have the same ability to pay, we
undermine the equity principle. 51 Thus, in order to comply with the equity
principle, which is a key taxation principle, the law should tax all kinds of
income similarly, no matter its source—whether salaries or unemployment
compensation.
One argument against taxing unemployment benefits is social. Taxation is
aimed not just at collecting tax, but also at promoting distributive justice. 52 In a
well-organized society, it is the state’s duty to assist the unemployed primarily
when the unemployment is involuntary, and one can say that the state fails to
integrate the unemployed in the labor market. This assistance should be
reinforced in global economic crises with high unemployment. Indeed, during
the 1930s and 40s, unemployment and many other social benefits were not taxed
in the United States. This practice was not specified in law, but in IRS
administrative rulings, which stated that those payments were similar to a state
gift and therefore tax exempt. 53
Although exempting unemployment benefits may be seen as inequitable tax
treatment (as discussed above), if we adopt John Rawls’ difference principle,
there are some instances where we may overrule equity to assist the least
advantaged. 54 Behind Rawls’ veil of ignorance, each individual cannot be sure
if he will be employed or unemployed. 55 Because exempting unemployment
benefits is open to each involuntary unemployed, and as current workers have
no guarantee that they would always be employed, treating unemployment

50. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, supra note 48, at 61.
51. See, e.g., Emil M. Sunley, Jr., Employee Benefits and Transfer Payments, in
COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 75 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977).
52. Richard A. Musgrave, Perspectives on and Limits to Public Finance for the Financing of
Social Policy in Market Economies, in PUB. FIN. AND SOC. POL’Y 261, 261–62, (Guy Terny & A.
J. Culyer eds., 1985).
53. Frank J. Sammartino & Richard A. Kasten, The Distributional Consequences of Taxing
Social Security Benefits: Current Law and Alternative Schemes, 8 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 28,
29–30 (1985), https://www.jstor.org/stable/4537928?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.
54. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT § 22.2 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).
55. Id. §6.
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benefits differently is not improper. Thus, tax law as a distributive mechanism
can help the (regular and chronic) unemployed.
Given that most developed countries implement unemployment benefits and
tax them, this Article adopts the current law and the “mainstream” argument that
unemployment benefits should be taxed, even during economic crises such as
the COVID-19 pandemic. It further adds a distinction that has not been made
by the law, between regularly and chronically unemployed.
B. The Lifecycle Argument
Equity is one of the four tax canons formulated by Adam Smith. 56 He stated
that “[t]he subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of the
government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that
is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under the
protection of the state.” 57 Nevertheless, even if scholars agree that taxes should
fulfill the equity principle, many questions arise. For example, what is a better
measurement for equity—income or consumption? 58 And when should we
impose taxes? This Article focuses on the second question.
Suppose we adopt the ability-to-pay principle as a good measurement of
equity. In that case, one can claim that a short period is not enough to evaluate
taxpayers’ ability to pay when they become chronically unemployed, as in the
current global crisis. Following this argument, only a longer period—such as
individuals’ lifecycle—can serve for a proper estimation.
Lifecycle theory examines taxpayers’ ability to pay over their lifetime, as
opposed to an arbitrary (albeit straightforward) assessment of income over a
one-year period. Lifecycle theory was developed by economists in the early
twentieth century. 59 In general, it considers the use of income and consumption
over the course of individuals’ lives. It can be roughly divided into two
hypotheses: the permanent income hypothesis and the lifecycle model. 60
Developed by Milton Friedman, the former examines rational individuals who
consume products and services in consideration of their expected rather than
current income. 61 The lifecycle model was conceived by Modigliani and

56. 5 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATION
639
(S.
M.
Soares
ed.,
2007)
(e-book),
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf.
57. Id.
58. Compare William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax,
87 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (1974) (supporting tax consumption), with Alvin C. Warren, Jr.,
Comment, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 931, 931 (1975) (supporting income tax).
59. See Lee Anne Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation Over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
60. See id. at 6–7.
61. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, A THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 20–37 (1957).
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Brumberg 62 and later developed by Ando and Modigliani. 63 This model focuses
on individuals’ expected decisions of spending and saving over a lifetime. These
two hypotheses share the fact that they take into consideration the lifetime
sequence for economic decisions.
Naturally, those hypotheses are highly abstract and face theoretical and
empirical criticisms, as well as counter-theories. 64 For example, real individuals
are not aware of their “permanent income;” 65 real individuals also suffer from
cognitive biases, 66 and face difficulties moving money within periods. 67 Due to
the underlying difficulties of the lifecycle theory, scholars from various
disciplines, including both economists and lawyers, have been referring to the
lifecycle model mainly as an applicable yardstick. 68
Because lifecycle theory cannot be easily implemented, tax laws adopt the
taxable year as the relevant period for measuring taxpayers’ ability to pay.
Income tax liability is calculated in the United States, Canada, and many other
jurisdictions on the basis of a “taxable year,” 69 usually twelve months. 70 Tax
returns are also filed annually. 71 In some rare circumstances, a taxable year may
be shorter than twelve months, such as when a business is closed during part of

62. See generally, e.g., Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the
Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in 6 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF
FRANCO MODIGLIANI 3–45 (2005).
63. ALAN J. AUERBACH & LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLICY 10 (1987).
64. See Fennell & Stark, supra note 59, at 16–18 (reviewing studies showing little support for
the lifecycle hypotheses, and emphasizing the direct relationship between consumption and income
within time).
65. Id. at 9.
66. See id. at 11, 13–16 (discussing the behavioral life-cycle model); see generally Hersh M.
Shefrin & Richard H. Thaler, The Behavioral Life-Cycle Hypothesis, 26 ECON. INQUIRY 609 (1988)
(discussing “behavioral features” that should be included in economic analysis to “enrich” the lifecycle model).
67. See Fennell & Stark, supra note 59, at 11–12.
68. See, e.g., Andrés Erosa & Martin Gervais, Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies,
105 J. ECON. THEORY 338, 338–39 (2002) (concluding that the optimal tax scheme would be taxing
consumption—which indirectly taxes leisure—and labor income at different tax rates over a
taxpayers’ lifecycle); Daniel V. Gordon & Jean-François Wen, Tax Penalties on Fluctuating
Incomes: Estimates from Longitudinal Data, 25 INT’L TAX PUB. FIN. 430, 454–55 (2018)
(concluding that the optimal tax scheme would be taxing consumption—which indirectly taxes
leisure—and labor income at different tax rates over taxpayers’ lifecycle).
69. See I.R.C. § 441(a) (stating “[t]axable income shall be computed on the basis of
the taxpayer’s taxable year”); Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1, s. (2)(1) (5th supp.) (stating that
in Canada, the tax year is also calculated annually).
70. Glossary of Tax Terms, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm, (last visited May 16, 2021) (defining “taxable
year” as “[t]he period (usually 12 months) during which the tax liability of an individual or entity
is calculated”).
71. I.R.C. § 6072(a) (stating that in the case of a calendar year, a tax return should be filed
not later than April 15).
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the year. 72 Finally, a taxable year can be either a calendar or a fiscal year—both
of which consist of a twelve month period but commence and end on different
dates. 73
Notwithstanding the criticism of measuring income on a lifetime basis,
measuring tax liability annually is merely a matter of convenience. It makes tax
calculation simpler, but sometimes even the law itself deviates from the annual
calculation. 74 This Article asserts that, in some cases, we should abandon the
taxable year and measure individuals’ ability to pay over a longer period
(somewhat in line with lifecycle theory). Basing individuals’ ability to pay on a
period longer than a taxable year better reflects their financial security and aligns
with tax rationales.
Similarly, in the case of long-term unemployment, tax law should consider a
period longer than one year to measure the low income of the unemployed. Let
us consider an individual who worked for six months in 2020, became
unemployed, and was then entitled to six months’ unemployment benefits. This
individual would be subject to tax liability in 2020 for both his salary and
unemployment compensation. However, if this individual remained jobless for
at least one year in 2021 and afterwards—due to, for example, the global
pandemic—his tax liability in that year would be null (assuming no other
income). If on the other hand, he only lost his job at the beginning of 2021, it is
plausible to assume that his total tax liability would be very low, because it
would be spread over a period of twelve months. This example illustrates that
calculating the tax liability of a chronically unemployed individual can be
subject to extreme variation to the point of being arbitrary.
In the short term, unemployment benefits are seen as a substitute for work,
but their true nature—which impacts equity—can be revealed only after a longer
period of examining whether the unemployed got back to work. The chronically
unemployed cannot be treated similarly to the “regularly” unemployed who
eventually rejoin the workforce. Tax law should take this economic nadir of the
chronically unemployed into consideration. Assessing this individual’s ability
to pay over a period of one year can be erroneous. Because chronic
unemployment is a continuation of the “regular” unemployment period, tax law
should assess tax liability over the full period of unemployment rather than over
a random annual period.

72. I.R.C. § 443(a)(2).
73. I.R.C. § 441(b) (stating that “[f]or purposes of this subtitle, the term ‘taxable year’
means—(1) the taxpayer’s annual accounting period, if it is a calendar year or a fiscal year; (2)
the calendar year, if subsection (g) applies”); id. § 441(d) (stating that “calendar year” is “a period
of 12 months ending on December 31”); id. § 441(e) (stating that “fiscal year” is “a period of 12
months ending on the last day of any month other than December”).
74. I.R.C. § 1341; see I.R.C. § 1212(a)(1)(A)–(B) (explaining carryover and carryback of
capital losses).
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C. The Two-Tier Reciprocity Principle
Before this analysis continues, discussing the lifecycle argument and our
research question, we must distinguish between the three taxation periods
relevant to our discussion: employment, regular unemployment, and chronic
unemployment. Keeping these three periods in mind, the question becomes:
should we tax unemployment benefits given to an unemployed person who
became chronically unemployed? And if yes, how?
In order to assess the proper taxation of the chronically unemployed, this
Article adopts the reciprocity principle, proposing three taxation periods that
reflect reciprocal relationships between a taxpayer and society and examining
the reciprocity between two adjacent relationships. The principle of reciprocity
applies between society and the taxpayer during the employment and the regular
unemployment periods, and should continue to apply during the regular and
chronic unemployment periods. As mentioned previously, tax payment during
the employment period serves as unemployment insurance. Classifying
unemployment benefits for tax purposes is not self-evident and should not be
seen as a regular income in an isolated period. Unemployment benefits should
be understood on the basis of the reciprocity principle and three tax periods as
discussed in this Article.
It is claimed in this Article that adopting a tax mechanism that alleviates the
tax burden on the unemployed during long-term unemployment promotes the
reciprocity principle, 75 which is a basic concept in ethics theories 76 (and
simultaneously reflects equitable taxation according to the ability-to-pay
principle). Each reciprocity theory looks for a different common ground to
justify individuals’ cooperation. 77 One option is to justify reciprocity on the
basis of the social contract. 78 Rawls, for example, believed in the social contract
as a justification for the state, and thus its citizens had a duty to comply with the
law. 79 An organized society that espouses principles of justice is the key element
for the social contract. As previously stated, this Article adopts the reciprocity
75F

76F

7F

78F

79F

75. See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOC.
REV. 161, 171–76 (1960) (discussing the universality of the reciprocity principle).
76. Rawls’ moral philosophy is based, in part, on the reciprocity principle. [Rawls, supra
note 54, §18.3. Note that some scholars claim that a reciprocity principle requiring an exchange of
value cannot serve as a baseline in moral theories, since, for example, disabled persons cannot be
productive. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, Justice as Reciprocity Versus Subject-Centered Justice, 19
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 227, 230–31 (1990); Andrew Lister, Justice as Fairness and Reciprocity, 1
ANALYSE & KRITIK 93, 93–94 (2011).
77. See Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability, 116 ETHICS 9, 18–19
(2005).
78. The Social Contract is also part of Hobbes’, Locke’s, and Rousseau’s moral philosophies.
See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 67–68 (George Routledge and Sons 2d ed. 1886); JOHN LOCK,
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 51–53 (Richard Cox ed., 1982); JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 163–64 (Susan
Dunn ed., 2002).
79. See generally, JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
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principle mainly from Rawls’ perspective, given his concern with the growing
problem of global inequity and the presence of the least advantaged in
society 80—in our case, the chronically unemployed.
The premise of this Article is that reciprocity should be grounded in law and
not merely social norms. A legal form of reciprocity grants individuals rights,
but also imposes duties. As discussed earlier, the reciprocity principle is a key
feature in the social contract theory, and each individual carries rights and duties
in a cooperative society. 81 In a well-organized society, individuals have
explicitly or implicitly consented to give up some rights in exchange for others
in order to live in an organized society that can protect their rights. Individuals
are aware that their cooperation has two facets—losses and gains—with the
latter outweighing the former. For example, an individual must pay taxes, and
surrender some of his property; but, in exchange, he receives a well-organized
society and enjoys public goods and services.
To live in an organized state, members of society are willing to abandon some
rights in order to be secure (and to secure their rights). This tradeoff is enabled
by the enlightenment-era social contract that Rawls revived in the twentieth
century. Rawls believed that the most reasonable principles of justice are those
based on mutual consent—on a social contract. 82 These principles recognize the
basic rights of freedom and equality and strive to minimize the gap for the sake
of the poorest in society. According to Rawls, the basic premise of justice as
fairness is the idea that society is a set of rules ensuring fair, long-lasting
cooperation for generations. 83 This premise rests on two related ideas: that
individuals are free and equal, and the well-ordered society. 84 With these ideas,
is his argument that the difference principle, 85 as a distributive one, is part of the
reciprocity principle? 86 Accordingly, better-off individuals would not continue
to increase their wealth unless it also advances the least advantaged in society or
at least does not harm their position.
80. RAWLS, supra note 54, at § 13.1; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83–86 (1999).
While Rawls does not provide an exact definition of the least advantaged, some scholars argue that
the situation of the least advantaged is not to be measured by purely economic but also by social
parameters. See, e.g., M. W. Jackson, The Least Advantaged Class in Rawls’s Theory, 12 CAN. J.
POL. SCI. 727, 728 (1979); Roy C. Weatherford, Defining the Least Advantaged, 33 PHIL. Q. 63,
67 (1983).
81. See Gouldner, supra note 75, at 168 (contrasting reciprocity with the concept of
complementarity, where the right of one individual is the duty of the other).
82. RAWLS, supra note 54, at §6.3.
83. Id. § 2.2.
84. Id. §§ 2.1, 3.1, 7.
85. See id. §§ 13.1, 18.1 (explaining that the difference principle is part of the second principle
of justice, and stating “[s]ocial and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they
are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of
opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of
society”).
86. See id. §18.3 (explaining that “the difference principle is essentially a principle of
reciprocity”).
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The reciprocity principle is also applicable when examining individuals’
duties, such as tax payments, and the rights of the unemployed (and specifically
the chronically unemployed who are parallel to Rawls’ least advantaged). On
the one hand, the unemployed were productive during their working period and
contributed to the state; and now, when unemployed, the state helps them. Tax
payment, in general, is an example of reciprocity 87—individuals ought to pay
taxes in order to live in a well-organized society, where taxes are used to finance
public goods and services for the benefit of the society, even if taxes are
unrequited. 88 As elaborated below, taxation of the chronically unemployed does
not fully comply with the reciprocity principle. In general, an employee must
regularly pay his taxes during his employment period (Period I). These
payments are necessary to live in a well-organized society and are partly aimed
at ensuring his unemployed benefits in case he becomes unemployed, as
discussed in Part III. The worker’s duty to pay taxes is weighed against his
future right to receive financial assistance from the state once he becomes
unemployed, and the current right of other individuals in society if they are
considered chronically unemployed.
The reciprocity between the individual and the state continues to exist also
during his regular unemployment (Period II). During this period, he is entitled
to unemployment benefits. The taxes paid during Period I are returned to the
unemployed in the form of insurance benefits, which are in turn taxed because
they are linked to his employment period and contribute to his wealth during
unemployment. At this stage, the unemployed individual receives support from
the state, and, in exchange, he continues paying taxes on the insurance benefits.
This is the case in many developed countries, as described in Part II. Thus, the
tax payments during Period I are used to finance the insurance benefits of the
unemployed during Period II and constitute the first reciprocity phase, as defined
throughout this Article.
The above discussion emphasizes that the reciprocity principle is already
indirectly assimilated into the tax discourse. This Article suggests extending the
principle over different periods in an individual’s lifecycle in order to conform
with the equity principle. To do so, we must differentiate between “regular” and
chronic unemployment. Thus, the situation changes in Period III, when the
individual is no longer regularly, but rather chronically, unemployed. Recall
that the chronically unemployed are unemployed individuals who seek work but
87. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 77, at 22 (stating reciprocity does not require an equivalent
value).
88. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., Glossary of Statistical Terms, Taxes,
SNA 7.48 [8.43] (Nov. 18, 2001), http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2657 (defining taxes
as “compulsory, unrequited payments, in cash or in kind, made by institutional units to government
units; they are described as unrequited because the government provides nothing in return to the
individual unit making the payment, although governments may use the funds raised in taxes to
provide goods or services to other units, either individually or collectively, or to the community as
a whole”) (emphasis added).
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cannot find a job after exhausting their rights to unemployment insurance. 89 As
seen before, many unemployed became chronically so due to the global
economic crisis that accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the period
of entitlement for unemployment benefits varies across countries, each state
should set its own time for commencing Period III, while taking economic
considerations into account. 90 Whether this period starts after six or twelve
months of unemployment, using Rawls’ terminology this group is considered
the least advantaged in society because, at this stage, they cannot financially
contribute to society.
Cooperation between the state and the individual at this stage is necessary
because their relationship is productive at its origin. Before, during Period I, the
individual was a productive worker who contributed to the state by paying taxes
(among other things), and, in Period III, he continues to be unemployed,
involuntarily. One can even say that the state has failed to help him rejoin the
working force and now has the duty to secure him. The premise of this claim is
that the unemployment is not voluntary; otherwise, this would cease to be a
reciprocal relationship and become an exploitative use of social resources.91
When unemployment is chronic, the state has failed in its duty to support
individuals in critical times and help them find a proper job. In order to preserve
the reciprocity principle, the state should therefore restitute the tax collected
from the unemployed during Period II. The reciprocity at this stage strengthens
redistribution, but this move—this aspect of reciprocity—is absent from current
law.
The reciprocity principle is based on redistribution rationales, but it is
supported by the lifecycle theory discussed above. 92 Unemployment benefits
are taxed because they are considered a substitute for wages and their taxation
supports the equity principle. The principle of reciprocity is reinforced by the
lifecycle theory and their combination leads to the state’s duty to restitute the
tax collected from unemployment benefits. This give-and-take relationship
between an individual and the state should not be simultaneous but subsequent—
in other words, the activity in Period I projects on Period II, and the latter
projects on Period III, creating two phases. The first phase refers to the
reciprocity between the first two periods, and the second phase to the reciprocity
between the last two.
Naturally, the duration and even occurrence of these periods vary
individually. Some individuals never face unemployment at all, whereas others
face both regular and chronic unemployment. Therefore, basing the taxation of
unemployment benefits on the technical dichotomy of employed-vs.unemployed, detached from the individual’s real life—and from his actual
89.
90.
91.
92.

See Burtless, supra note 8.
See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Gouldner, supra note 75, at 166–67.
See supra Part IV.B.
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economic situation—undermines the reciprocity principle and the core principle
of good taxation: equity. The unemployment benefits given to the unemployed
are not given out of context. They are paid in Period II as a compensation for
working during Period I. State support stops when the unemployed go back to
work. In this case, the relevant period is again Period I, which may last for a
long time and is not a fixed interval.
The state should continue supporting the unemployed individuals, from a tax
perspective, if it has failed to integrate them in the working force, which brings
us to Period III. If we had known the duration of Period II and III in advance, it
is plausible to assume that we would not have taxed those individuals because
the unemployment compensation should have served throughout this time and
averaging this income over a long period probably would not reach tax liability.
Because we cannot predict the future of the unemployed during Period II,
however, the state should—and does—continue taxing unemployment benefits
during Period II, but reimburses them during Period III if the unemployed
individual becomes chronically so. The individual’s real ability to pay can be
gauged only by combining Periods II and III. To do so we must disregard the
calendar year because it is a technical standard and chronic unemployment may
be shorter, but usually longer, than one calendar year.
To conclude, tax law should differentiate between “regular” unemployment
and chronic unemployment. Taxing chronic unemployment cannot be done over
one calendar year, regardless of prior income and taxation.
D. Recommendations for the Proper Taxation of Chronically Unemployed
Based on the above analysis linking the reciprocity principle with lifecycle
theory, we would like to recommend the proper taxation of the chronically
unemployed. To do so, unemployment cannot be treated as a single period, but
must be reconsidered using the three possible periods in a taxpayer’s life. The
main problem arises when an unemployed individual becomes chronically
unemployed. This Article follows the current law and the mainstream claim that
unemployment benefits should be taxed in order to achieve equity. A failure to
tax these benefits would result in discrimination against working people with the
same income as the unemployed, who are subject to taxation. 93 However, a
critical problem regarding chronic unemployment is that during their regular
unemployment period (Period II), it is impossible to know if unemployed
individuals will become chronically unemployed. Since no one, including the
individual himself, knows in advance if the unemployed taxpayer becomes
chronically so, the proposal is not ex ante but ex post. Therefore, this Article’s
recommendation refers to the second reciprocity phase, after the taxation of the
benefits paid to the regularly unemployed.
Note that this proposal is limited to answering the question of how
unemployment benefits should be taxed when an unemployed taxpayer becomes
93. See supra Part IV.A.
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chronically so. Therefore, this approach follows the common law in continuing
to tax unemployed benefits but diverges from current practices by proposing to
accumulate the unemployed benefit taxes in a special state fund, which should
be gradually reimbursed to the chronically unemployed. 94 The fund should pay
interest on all accumulations and compensate beneficiaries on a monthly rather
than annual basis in order to serve as a substitute for a steady income. The
amount of reimbursement depends on several factors, such as the duration of the
unemployment and the extent of unemployment benefits. Every month, it
should average the total income of the unemployed during a period of the last
twelve months. 95 Therefore, theoretically, the reimbursed amount can change
every month. As long as the chronic unemployment starts at an early stage, and
as long as the unemployment benefits are higher, the reimbursement will be paid
out more gradually and spread over a longer period. In some cases, the
reimbursement can also be a single payment, at an amount considered as gross
income and included in the individual’s annual tax calculation. The
reimbursement should conclude whenever the chronically unemployed
individual starts working, and the amount that is left in the special state fund
should be transferred to the treasury after a predetermined period. 96
Officially, the fund belongs to the unemployed: if the unemployed individual
becomes chronically unemployed, he may gradually receive the aforesaid
payments out of the fund. However, the treasury receives the remainder of the
fund once the chronically unemployed individual returns to work. Although
officially the funds belong to the unemployed during the second stage of
reciprocity, pecunia non olet. 97 Thus, the state can use those funds and we
analogize the state here to a financial institution. If necessary, the state can use
the unemployed funds for its purposes, similar to a bank using customer’s
accounts according to certain reserve requirements. The difference, however,
lies in the fact that the state is the sole owner of the money left in the funds after
the chronically unemployed rejoin the labor market. This may also induce the
state to assist chronically unemployed individuals to return to work. Using the
fund as a channel to balance the payments to and from tax authorities may
seemingly complicate a tax system that usually depends on an annual base tax
94. It should be noted that if the unemployed person is unemployed for a very long period,
and all the funds were refunded to him, tax law no longer has a role in assisting this person and the
state should use other social programs to assist him. See discussion supra Part I.
95. See, e.g., William Vickrey, Averaging of Income for Income-Tax Purposes, 47 J. POL.
ECON. 379, 379 (1939); see generally Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging
Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395 (2003).
96. The period in which the fund’s money is be transferred to the treasury should be based on
statistical data. If empirical data show that chronically unemployed tend to keep their new job for
a long period, the fund can be automatically transferred to the state and vice versa. In addition, we
may think of a different alternative: using this amount as an additional incentive for the unemployed
for rejoining the labor market and holding a stabile position. This latter alternative requires further
empirical research and is beyond the scope of the tax discourse.
97. In Latin, “money does not smell.”
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calculation. Nevertheless, in a world with digital payments and electronic
correspondence between tax authorities, the additional fund can be easily
implemented.
Since this Article limits itself to taxation and proposes to continue taxing the
unemployment benefits as under the current law, it suggests accumulating
unemployment benefit taxes in a special fund and reimbursing them ex post in
cases where the unemployed move to Period III and become chronically
unemployed.
V. CONCLUSION
In our rapidly changing world, with the digital economy and global crises,
unemployment—and particularly long-term unemployment—is still a
macroeconomic problem. This Article examines the proper policy of taxing
long-term unemployment, which has become more acute in light of the
coronavirus pandemic. This Article argues that tax systems should take into
consideration whether the unemployed reenter the labor market or not. It
focuses on security benefits paid out of unemployment insurance programs to
unemployed who become chronically so. Because unemployment insurance
programs are well rooted in many developed countries, our recommendations
are practically relevant to all of those jurisdictions.
In order to assess the proper taxation of the chronically unemployed, this
Article adopts the reciprocity principle, reinforced by lifecycle theory, which
examines taxpayers’ ability to pay over a longer period, as opposed to an
arbitrary assessment of income over a one-year period. In cases of continuous
unemployment, a proper tax should estimate the income liability of the
unemployed over a more reciprocal-representative period and not over one
calendar tax year.
The Article further proposes three taxation periods reflecting reciprocal
relationships between a taxpayer and society—employment, regular
unemployment, and chronic unemployment—and then examines the reciprocity
between two adjacent periods. It focuses on the second reciprocity period, where
the unemployed become chronically so, and provides an ex-post mechanism to
implement the principle of reciprocity even in this period.
Unemployment benefits are provided as a substitute for wages and coincide
with the principle of reciprocity. The true nature of unemployment benefits,
however, can only be observed over time and not in advance. If the unemployed
cannot get a job for a long period (e.g. during a recession), and may be
considered chronically unemployed, it is doubtful whether unemployment
benefits continue to be equivalent to salaries. In that case, such benefits may be
considered more as unemployment assistance or work disablement, and it would
be incorrect to randomly tax such income in each tax year separately.
The Article supports the general taxation of unemployment benefits of
“regularly” unemployed individuals; however, equity is compromised when tax
law does not differentiate between unemployment benefits received by regularly
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and by chronically unemployed. Note that this Article limits itself to the proper
taxation of the chronically unemployed following the framework of the current
law. It does not seek to reform social benefits for the chronically unemployed,
nor does it claim that tax law is the best method to address chronic
unemployment. Realistically, more effective mechanisms outside the scope of
taxation are available. However, the current law of taxing the chronically
unemployed is incompatible with the equity principle and requires some
amendments.
Therefore, the Article’s proposal is limited to answering the question of how
unemployment benefits should be taxed when an unemployed taxpayer becomes
chronically so. Therefore, it proposes accumulating the unemployed benefit
taxes in a special state fund, which should be gradually reimbursed to the
chronically unemployed. In a digital economy, this fund could easily be
implemented, and this alternative mechanism introduces social considerations
of assisting the least advantaged—in our case, the chronically unemployed—
into mainstream tax discourse.

